Putin Worries NATO Much More Than You Think

In debates over Russia, the argument often comes down to a simple proposition: Having struggled for three years and seen his forces mauled in Ukraine, is it really plausible that President Vladimir Putin would take on the combined might of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? It’s time to put that question to bed.

I spent a day this week with a group of generals and other officers in uniform from around 20 countries. They had collected at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute to talk about the recreation of army corps as the primary organizational unit for fighting wars. These are the large, combined service formations we thought redundant once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but are now – largely thanks to Putin – back in fashion.

What I walked away with was the understanding that those who would have to do any fighting aren’t asking if the threat of a Russian attack on a NATO member is real, but rather where, when and in what form it comes. Nor are they speculating over what US President Donald Trump might or might not do. Their biggest concern is how little time they may have to prepare.

At the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO commanders were as surprised as anyone else by the ineptness of the Russian assault on Kyiv, a debacle that saw the cream of Moscow’s combat troops and equipment destroyed. But any complacency that followed has now gone.

Rather than 5-10 years, as once thought, the working estimate for when Putin might have the capabilities to take on NATO once he’s done in Ukraine is now multi-layered and comes from a Danish intelligence assessment earlier this year: six months for a localized attack, two years for a regional Baltic war, and five for any wider European conflict.

The combat force Putin has in the field is by now twice as large as when he ordered the invasion in 2022, and he continues to recruit. Production of arms and munitions has soared. Exposure to the advanced Western weaponry — think HIMARS — has allowed the Russians time to figure out how to neutralize them. The absolute advantage Ukraine once held in battlefield innovation has evaporated. The Russian air force, built to fight NATO, is modern and has been preserved intact.

Again and again, I heard something approaching admiration for the speed at which Russian forces have learned and adapted in Ukraine.

In terms of drone and electronic warfare, Russia is probably ahead of NATO. The war has proved that having a small number of exquisitely capable unmanned aircraft can’t compete for impact with sheer quantity and adaptability.