Trump’s Resource Grab in Ukraine Is a Price Worth Paying

President Donald Trump says he wants some of Ukraine’s resources in return for continued aid — and the demand is, as his German counterpart Olaf Scholz quickly said, “selfish.” He might have added “unseemly.” If the US is to monetize its support for Kyiv’s defense, after all, then why shouldn’t the dozens of other countries that have been helping out? And if that happened, nothing would be left but a nation’s bones.

Europe, however, should stop complaining, let Trump have his deal and avoid a divisive scramble for the assets Ukraine will need for its postwar reconstruction. That’s especially true of Scholz’s Germany. But let’s start with what Trump got wrong before getting to why his demand is a price worth paying.

Ukraine’s leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy put the offer of natural resources into his so-called “Victory Plan” last year precisely to appeal to Trump’s famously transactional nature. Never mind that Ukraine isn’t rich in the rare-earth metals Trump talked about, but in lithium, manganese, titanium and uranium; the American president isn’t a details man.

Trump was also wrong to claim the US has given more to Ukraine than Europe has. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which closely tracks pledges and deliveries of all military, financial and humanitarian aid to Kyiv, Europe had — as of Kiel’s update ending Oct. 31 — both promised and delivered substantially more than the US. (The figures will have changed since, and a new update is due this month, but the essential point remains).

Adjust those figures for the size of the two economies — US gross domestic product is now roughly 50% higher than the European Union’s — and the ratio of generosity is still more in Europe’s favor.

It would be great in so many ways if the leader of the free world cared about facts or truth. But in this case, it makes little difference, because Trump is right when he says Europe has a bigger stake in making sure Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions for expanding his sphere of control stop in eastern Ukraine. The US also has a strong interest, but simple geography means that halting Moscow’s advance is more important to Warsaw or Berlin than it is to Washington. So, Europe should be paying and doing more.

Trump could also point out that Germany isn’t above prioritizing “selfish” economic interests either. According to a Financial Times report last week, a debate has already begun within Europe over whether to offer a resumption of trade in piped Russian natural gas as part of the quid pro quo in a ceasefire deal, with Germany and Hungary said to be in favor.

That should come as no surprise. It was Putin who ended piped gas deliveries in retaliation against EU sanctions, not the other way around. He expected the supply shock to drive up Europe’s energy costs sharply, as it did, wreaking havoc on Germany’s business model. But the move was also self-defeating. Russia’s Gazprom was unable to divert the same gas to new export markets, due to lack of infrastructure, and was forced to sell to subsidized domestic consumers at a loss. The company now has to service more than $70 billion of accumulated debt and has had less profit for the state to tax and spend on fighting Ukraine.

So, unlike Trump’s admittedly grubby plan, which would further the security goals of Ukraine and its allies, buying more Russian gas before a full political settlement has been reached would undermine them, because it would reduce pressure on Putin to end the war.

Making allies pay for aid in their defense is as old as war itself. Even the 1941 US Lend-Lease Act — which gave Britain and the Soviet Union the funds and weapons to stay in the fight against Nazi Germany — consisted of loans that had to be repaid, with interest. The UK didn’t make its last instalment until 2006.