Trump’s Hard Line in Latin America Leaves China Room to Maneuver
The president’s take on the Monroe Doctrine is all stick and no carrot — a reductive approach to the great power game between the US and China in Latin America.
Demonstrators wave a huge Venezuelan flag during a march to demand the release of deposed Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro in Caracas on Jan. 9.
Photographer: Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images
Only a few hours before he was abducted by US special forces, President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela met with Ambassador Qui Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy for Latin America. It was Maduro’s last official activity as head of state. That meeting in many ways embodied the ambiguity and awkwardness of China’s position in the whole Venezuelan imbroglio, both in the run-up to and in the aftermath of the Jan. 3 events that led to the bombing of the Venezuelan capital and the killing of an estimated 100 people.
On the one hand, China spoke out forcefully against the pressure exerted by the US on Venezuela over the past five months. On the other hand, Chinese diplomatic protestations were ultimately as ineffective as the Chinese air defense systems Venezuela had in place to protect its territory