$333B
$156B
$60B
–$506B
2009
2018
2009
2018
$333B
$156B
$60B
–$506B
2009
2018
2009
2018
The industry that gave rise to investing titans Peter Lynch, Bill Miller and Bill Gross is facing an existential crisis.
For years, mom-and-pop investors frustrated by high fees and subpar returns from big-name money managers have been shifting their savings into ultra-cheap funds that simply mimic the returns generated by benchmark stock and bond indexes. Passive investing, as it is known, was in. Active was out.
At first, few noticed the trickle of money out of funds run by star money managers into cheaper index products. But now, no one can ignore the flood. The exodus from active funds has sent fees inexorably lower, led to the loss of thousands of jobs and forced large-scale consolidation among firms. That’s pushing the industry, with $74 trillion in assets as measured by Boston Consulting Group, towards a shakeout where only the strongest will survive.
“We’re clearly at a watershed moment,” said Philip Darling, head of partnerships at The Buy-Side Club, a consultant to the investment management industry.
Companies sized by their 2018 assets under management, colored by change in AUM from 2014–2018:
–10
0
10
25
50
+100%
$20.7T
U.S.
Vanguard
Pimco
T. Rowe
Price
Affiliated
Managers
Capital
Group
Fidelity
Invesco
Legg
Mason
BlackRock
Franklin
Templeton
$4.7T
Europe
Standard
Life
Aberdeen
Man
Group
Baillie
Gifford
GAM
Anima
SGR
Amundi
Schroders
DWS
Janus
Henderson
Ashmore
Companies sized by their 2018 assets under management,
colored by change in AUM from 2014–2018:
–10
0
10
25
50
+100%
$20.7T
U.S.
Pimco
Invesco
Fidelity
Vanguard
Affiliated
Managers
BlackRock
T. Rowe
Price
Capital Group
Franklin
Templeton
Legg
Mason
$4.7T
Europe
Man Group
GAM
Standard
Life
Aberdeen
Baillie
Gifford
Anima
SGR
Amundi
Ashmore
Schroders
Janus
Henderson
DWS
Companies sized by their 2018 assets under management, colored by change in AUM from 2014–2018:
–10
0
10
25
50
+100%
$20.7T
U.S.
$4.7T
Europe
Vanguard
Man Group
GAM
Pimco
Baillie
Gifford
Standard
Life
Aberdeen
T. Rowe
Price
Anima
SGR
Amundi
Ashmore
Affiliated
Managers
Schroders
Fidelity
Capital Group
Janus
Henderson
DWS
Franklin
Templeton
Invesco
BlackRock
Legg
Mason
Companies sized by their 2018 assets under management, colored by change in AUM from 2014–2018:
–10
0
10
25
50
+100%
$20.7T
U.S.
$4.7T
Europe
Pimco
Invesco
Man
Group
GAM
Fidelity
Baillie
Gifford
Standard Life
Aberdeen
Vanguard
Anima
SGR
Amundi
Ashmore
Schroders
Affiliated
Managers
BlackRock
Janus
Henderson
DWS
T. Rowe
Price
Capital Group
Franklin
Templeton
Legg
Mason
To understand how that moment will play out and who the winners and losers will be, Bloomberg News drilled into fee, personnel and performance data across the industry. The analysis reveals just how unforgiving the environment has become for active fund managers that lack scale or a compelling raison d’etre.
The combination of fee competition, rising costs and asset growth is creating never-before-seen pressures on asset managers, said Ben Phillips, principal and investment management chief strategist at consulting firm Casey Quirk, a unit of Deloitte Consulting LLP.
“That creates a really bitter cocktail for an industry that never had to worry about fixed costs, fees or money showing up,” Phillips said. “The entire industry has been caught flat-footed. Nobody saw it coming. That sounds a little glib, but nobody acted to get around the corner first.”
Investors have responded by stampeding into passive investments in recent years. Index funds are poised to overtake active management in the U.S. by 2021, according to estimates issued in March by Moody’s Investors Service.
33%
U.S.
31%
Asia
19%
Europe
11%
Canada
33%
U.S.
31%
Asia
19%
Europe
11%
Canada
33%
U.S.
31%
Asia
19%
Europe
11%
Canada
The idea that active investing can be overrated certainly isn’t new. Burton Malkiel, the Princeton University economist who wrote the 1973 investing classic “A Random Walk Down Wall Street,” famously compared the prowess of money managers to a blindfolded monkey throwing darts to pick stocks. Jack Bogle, the late founder of Vanguard Group Inc. who popularized index funds, was insistent that most active managers weren’t worth the fees they charged.
U.S. large-cap funds
17.9%
82.1%
Europe equity funds
80.2%
19.8%
But the idea didn’t really garner widespread attention until shell-shocked investors evaluated the damage to their portfolios after the 2008 financial crisis. Even when markets bounced back after hitting their trough in early 2009, many managers couldn’t recover.
Legg Mason Inc.’s Miller, who beat the S&P 500 for a record 15-year streak starting in 1991, hit a rough patch and failed to beat the Legg Mason Value Trust’s benchmark index for four out of five years after 2005. He was never able to come close to matching his previous feat. Gross retired this year after failing to live up to a stellar four-decade career that earned him the title of “bond king.”
In this new environment, the beneficiaries have been the world’s largest asset managers, who are wielding far more influence and increasingly attracting a larger share of investor money. They’ve been able to take advantage of their size to keep overall expenses down and help make up for lower fees. Crucially, they’re also the most likely to be offering both passive investments as well as actively managed funds. That means the biggest firms are just getting bigger: The two largest U.S. indexing titans—BlackRock Inc. and Vanguard—oversee combined assets of around $12 trillion this year, up from less than $8 trillion just five years ago.
Fidelity Investments once boasted the world’s largest mutual fund. But the Fidelity Magellan Fund that stock-picking star Lynch propelled from a $20 million offering into a multibillion-dollar behemoth is not even in the world’s top 25 mutual funds today, according to Morningstar. In a sign of the times, only three of the top 10 funds worldwide are actively managed funds, Morningstar data show.
[This is] a really bitter cocktail for an industry that never had to worry about fixed costs, fees or money showing up.
Below the top rung, firms such as Legg Mason and Franklin Resources Inc. have joined a parade of managers wringing out savings by trimming staff. Others are consolidating with mixed results. Janus Henderson Group Plc and Standard Life Aberdeen Plc have both pursued mergers to boost assets, although neither have been able to stanch outflows since their tie-ups.
In Europe, only one firm has surpassed the coveted $1 trillion milestone: Amundi SA. Yet it’s still dwarfed by BlackRock’s $6.8 trillion in assets under management, as of June of this year.
$49.6T
U.S.
31.9
Core Asset Managers (64.3%)
11.0
Banks (22.2%)
4.2
Insurance
(8.5%)
2.4
Other (4.9%)
$23.0T
Europe
9.5
Banks (41.3%)
6.6
Insurance
(28.5%)
5.7
Core Asset Managers
(24.9%)
1.2
Other (5.3%)
$49.6T
U.S.
$23.0T
Europe
9.5
Banks (41.3%)
6.6
Insurance
(28.5%)
31.9
Core Asset Managers (64.3%)
5.7
Core Asset Managers
(24.9%)
11.0
Banks (22.2%)
4.2
Insurance
(8.5%)
1.2
Other (5.3%)
2.4
Other (4.9%)
$49.6T
U.S.
$23.0T
Europe
31.9
Core Asset Managers (64.3%)
9.5
Banks (41.3%)
6.6
Insurance
(28.5%)
5.7
Core Asset Managers (24.9%)
1.2
Other
(5.3%)
11.0
Banks (22.2%)
4.2
Insurance (8.5%)
2.4
Other (4.9%)
$49.6T
U.S.
$23.0T
Europe
9.5
Banks (41.3%)
6.6
Insurance (28.5%)
31.9
Core Asset Managers (64.3%)
5.7
Core Asset Managers (24.9%)
1.2
Other
(5.3%)
11.0
Banks (22.2%)
4.2
Insurance (8.5%)
2.4
Other (4.9%)
Europe’s fund industry has remained fragmented, in part, because it’s dominated by divisions of banks and the link hasn’t been an advantage as the financial firms focused less on building their fund units and more on averting crisis after crisis.
“Should all active managers survive?” said Kathrin Hamilton, a partner at Baillie Gifford, an Edinburgh-based investment manager. “A lot of firms have been focusing on accumulating assets rather than delivering outcomes for their clients. If there is indeed a shakeout, let’s not assume that’s a bad thing.”
As the competition for assets has gotten increasingly intense, fund managers have been locked in fee wars that have pushed fund charges closer to zero for exposure to broad indexes. In a move that drew particular attention last year, Fidelity unveiled four index mutual funds with no annual fees.
Some of the relentless pressure has come from firms such as Vanguard, which offers among the cheapest indexed products on the market. Competitors like BlackRock, the world’s largest issuer of ETFs with more than $2 trillion in its iShares products, have the scale to offer products that charge less than $1 for every $1,000 invested.
“The entire financial sector is being challenged by pressures on margins and this trend is going to continue due to very low interest rates,” said Yves Perrier, chief executive officer of Amundi. “The industry is also being challenged by the development of passive management.”
2018 average
expense ratio
Type
Active equity funds
Change since 2008: –0.18
(percentage points)
0.76%
Active bond funds
Change since 2008: –0.10
0.55%
Index equity ETFs
Change since 2008: –0.09
0.20%
Index bond ETFs
Change since 2008: –0.03
0.16%
Index equity funds
Change since 2008: –0.10
0.08%
Index bond funds
Change since 2008: –0.09
0.07%
2018 average
expense ratio
Change since 2008
(percentage points)
Type
Trend
Active equity funds
0.76%
–0.18
Active bond funds
0.55%
–0.10
Index equity ETFs
0.20%
–0.09
Index bond ETFs
0.16%
–0.03
Index equity funds
–0.10
0.08%
Index bond funds
0.07%
–0.09
2018 average
expense ratio
Change since 2008
(percentage points)
Type
Trend
–0.18
Active equity funds
0.76%
0.55%
–0.10
Active bond funds
0.20%
–0.09
Index equity ETFs
0.16%
Index bond ETFs
–0.03
0.08%
Index equity funds
–0.10
Index bond funds
0.07%
–0.09
U.S. open-end mutual funds and exchange-traded funds saw a 6% fee decline in 2018 compared with the year before, Morningstar data show, resulting in $5.5 billion in savings to investors last year. It was the second-largest annual decline Morningstar has recorded since it began tracking trends in U.S. fund fees in 2000.
Investors are paying roughly half as much to own funds as they were nearly two decades ago and about a quarter less than five years ago.
If there is indeed a shakeout, let’s not assume that’s a bad thing.
Yet even active funds that beat the market are having a difficult time in the current climate. Take, for instance, one of the largest, the $120 billion-plus Fidelity Contrafund, which outperformed its benchmark, the S&P 500, for nine of the past 10 years, but has still seen more than $90 billion in net outflows since 2009. A possible beneficiary is Fidelity’s S&P 500 index fund, which has seen net inflows of more than $120 billion during the same period. The key difference: Contrafund’s fees have been as much as 10 times higher than its passive counterpart.
’09
▼
’11
▼
’13
▼
’15
▼
’17
▼
’19
▼
Cumulative returns
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
350%
A $10,000 investment in the Contrafund would’ve delivered approximately $3,900 more net of fees than the index fund since the start of 2009.
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Expense ratios
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
1.00%
Yet it charged much more than the Fidelity 500 Index Fund, which had near-zero fees for some investor classes.
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Cumulative net flows
Inflow
Outflow
$120B
100
As a result, the Fidelity 500 Index Fund has seen estimated total net inflows of $124 billion...
80
60
40
20
0
0
−20
−40
...while the Contrafund is almost a mirror image with total net outflows of $93 billion.
−60
−80
−100
Assets under management
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
$200B
175
This mix of factors helped the Fidelity 500 Index Fund bypass the Contrafund in size in November 2016.
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
▲
’09
▲
’11
▲
’13
▲
’15
▲
’17
▲
’19
’09
▼
’10
▼
’11
▼
’12
▼
’13
▼
’14
▼
’15
▼
’16
▼
’17
▼
’18
▼
’19
▼
Cumulative returns
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
350%
300
A $10,000 investment in the Contrafund would’ve delivered approximately $3,900 more net of fees than the index fund since the start of 2009.
250
200
150
100
50
0
Expense ratios
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
1.00%
Yet it charged much more than the Fidelity 500 Index Fund, which had near-zero fees for some investor classes.
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Cumulative net flows
Outflow
Inflow
$120B
100
80
As a result, the Fidelity 500 Index Fund has seen estimated total net inflows of $124 billion...
60
40
20
0
0
−20
...while the Contrafund is almost a mirror image with total net outflows of $93 billion.
−40
−60
−80
−100
Assets under management
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
$200B
175
This mix of factors helped the Fidelity 500 Index Fund bypass the Contrafund in size in November 2016.
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
▲
’09
▲
’10
▲
’11
▲
’12
▲
’13
▲
’14
▲
’15
▲
’16
▲
’17
▲
’18
▲
’19
2009
▼
2010
▼
2011
▼
2012
▼
2013
▼
2014
▼
2015
▼
2016
▼
2017
▼
2018
▼
2019
▼
Cumulative returns
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
350%
300
A $10,000 investment in the Contrafund would’ve delivered approximately $3,900 more net of fees than the index fund since the start of 2009.
250
200
150
100
50
0
Expense ratios
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
1.00%
Yet it charged much more than the Fidelity 500 Index Fund, which had near-zero fees for some investor classes.
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Cumulative net flows
Outflow
Inflow
$120B
100
80
As a result, the Fidelity 500 Index Fund has seen estimated total net inflows of $124 billion...
60
40
20
0
0
−20
...while the Contrafund is almost a mirror image with total net outflows of $93 billion.
−40
−60
−80
−100
Assets under management
Fidelity Contrafund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
$200B
175
This mix of factors helped the Fidelity 500 Index Fund bypass the Contrafund in size in November 2016.
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
▲
2009
▲
2010
▲
2011
▲
2012
▲
2013
▲
2014
▲
2015
▲
2016
▲
2017
▲
2018
▲
2019
It’s not just investors taking note of whether money managers are worth what they’re charging: the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority said it will look closely at underperforming active funds in its next annual report to shed light on whether they’re giving value to investors.
As scrutiny has intensified, some money managers are increasingly trying to justify their fees by pushing into ill-advised investments holding the promise of higher returns. Neil Woodford, the British star fund manager who made middle-England rich, barred withdrawals from his flagship fund when investors started asking for their money back faster than he could unwind illiquid holdings. Investors fled Natixis SA’s fund affiliate after Morningstar questioned the “liquidity and appropriateness” of some bond holdings. These risks further threaten to erode investors’ faith in active managers.
The sweeping changes coursing through the industry have exacted a human toll. Investment firms have slashed hundreds of jobs this year, with many turning to machines to help automate functions and cut costs. Legg Mason is cutting about 120 positions, or 12% of its staff, as it works to cut costs and increase profitability. In January, BlackRock said it would cut 500 jobs, in what amounts to the biggest headcount reduction since 2016. That same month, State Street said it planned to dismiss 1,500 workers.
Top executives haven’t been immune to the shakeout either. The changes have been especially striking in Europe: This year alone, more than 10 new CEOs have been installed at Europe’s fund firms. More than half of the CEOs at large asset managers globally took their roles in 2014 or later, according to a Casey Quirk report.
Mark Gregory
Q1
Merian Global Investors
Paula Burgess
Pensions Infrastructure Platform
Ron O’Hanley
State Street Corp.
William Nott
SYZ Asset Mgmt.
Ruth Handcock
Octopus Investments
Andrew Formica
Jupiter Fund Mgmt.
Julian Ide
Martin Currie
Keith Skeoch
Standard Life Aberdeen
Q2
Nicolaas Marais
Wells Fargo Asset Mgmt.
Paul Stockton
Rathbone Brothers
Michael Reinhard
Universal-Investment
Karen Brennan
LaSalle Investment Mgmt.
Javiera Ragnartz
SEB Investment Mgmt.
Q3
Marcel Renné
Feri AG
Peter Sanderson
GAM
Michelle Scrimgeour
Legal & General Investment Mgmt.
2017
2018
2019
Q1
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
David Barron
Gavin Rochussen
John Foley
Michelle Seitz
Sean Lam
Cyrus Taraporevala
Tim Buckley
John McCormick
Ronald Wuijster
Daniel Wild, Marius Dorfmeister
Thomas Wittwer
Mark Anson
Catherine Keating
Emilio Gonzalez
David Jacob (Interim CEO)
Anne Richards
Asoka Woehrmann
Brad Crombie
Christian Gast
Guang Yang
Mark Gregory
Paula Burgess
Ron O’Hanley
William Nott
Ruth Handcock
Andrew Formica
Julian Ide
Keith Skeoch
Nicolaas Marais
Paul Stockton
Michael Reinhard
Karen Brennan
Javiera Ragnartz
Marcel Renné
Peter Sanderson
Michelle Scrimgeour
Miton Group
Polar Capital
M&G Prudential
Russell Investments
Walker Crips Investment Mgmt.
State Street Global Advisors
Vanguard
Blackstone Alternative Asset Mgmt.
APG Asset Mgmt.
RobecoSAM
Vontobel Asset Mgmt.
Commonfund
BNY Mellon Wealth Mgmt.
JO Hambro Capital Mgmt.
GAM
Fidelity International
DWS Group
Alquity
Systematic Investment Mgmt.
BrightSphere Investment Group
Merian Global Investors
Pensions Infrastructure Platform
State Street Corp.
SYZ Asset Mgmt.
Octopus Investments
Jupiter Fund Mgmt.
Martin Currie
Standard Life Aberdeen
Wells Fargo Asset Mgmt.
Rathbone Brothers
Universal-Investment
LaSalle Investment Mgmt.
SEB Investment Mgmt.
Feri AG
GAM
Legal & General Investment Mgmt.
2017
2018
2019
Q1
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
David Barron
Gavin Rochussen
John Foley
Michelle Seitz
Sean Lam
Cyrus Taraporevala
Tim Buckley
John McCormick
Ronald Wuijster
Daniel Wild, Marius Dorfmeister
Thomas Wittwer
Mark Anson
Catherine Keating
Emilio Gonzalez
David Jacob (Interim CEO)
Anne Richards
Asoka Woehrmann
Brad Crombie
Christian Gast
Guang Yang
Mark Gregory
Paula Burgess
Ron O’Hanley
William Nott
Ruth Handcock
Andrew Formica
Julian Ide
Keith Skeoch
Nicolaas Marais
Paul Stockton
Michael Reinhard
Karen Brennan
Javiera Ragnartz
Marcel Renné
Peter Sanderson
Michelle Scrimgeour
Miton Group
Polar Capital
M&G Prudential
Russell Investments
Walker Crips Investment Management
State Street Global Advisors
Vanguard
Blackstone Alternative Asset Management
APG Asset Management
RobecoSAM
Vontobel Asset Management
Commonfund
BNY Mellon Wealth Management
JO Hambro Capital Management
GAM
Fidelity International
DWS Group
Alquity
Systematic Investment Management
BrightSphere Investment Group
Merian Global Investors
Pensions Infrastructure Platform
State Street Corp.
SYZ Asset Management
Octopus Investments
Jupiter Fund Management
Martin Currie
Standard Life Aberdeen
Wells Fargo Asset Management
Rathbone Brothers
Universal-Investment
LaSalle Investment Management
SEB Investment Management
Feri AG
GAM
Legal & General Investment Management
“The turnover of CEOs and leadership at asset managers has never been higher,” said The Buy-Side Club’s Darling. “And the main reason is because the leadership that’s required for the rapidly evolving landscape is not present at all the firms right now.”
While BlackRock created the template for the mega merger in 2009, when its acquisition of Barclays Global Investors made it the world’s largest money manager, consolidation has proved to be a bag of mixed results for other firms. Asset management deal-making hit a record in 2018, with 253 transactions announced and disclosed deal value rising 29% to $27.1 billion from 2017, according to research compiled by Sandler O’Neill & Partners LLP.
Two recent deals weren’t able to stem outflows, showing the risks of merging to survive.
Janus
Henderson
Standard Life
Aberdeen
2017
2018
2017
2018
–10.2
–$18.1B
–40.6
–$55.3B
Janus Henderson’s clients have yanked $38.5 billion in total since its 2017 tie-up, with the firm suffering its worst outflows in the second quarter this year. The combination of Aberdeen Asset Management and Standard Life, intended to create a heavyweight capable of competing with low-fee passive money managers, also failed to persuade investors to keep their money invested there.
“Last year was one of the most difficult investment environments since 1901,” Keith Skeoch, CEO of Standard Life Aberdeen said at the company’s annual general meeting in May. “That’s quite stressful and there’s a lot of uncertainty our people are coping with.”
“We knew it was going to be tough and would take years,” Skeoch said in a telephone interview in June about the tie up.
Those stumbles haven’t cast a chill on mergers in the industry.
In Europe, Deutsche Bank’s DWS Group has been exploring tie-ups with other asset managers to gain scale and had favored a potential deal with UBS Group AG’s asset management unit. Those talks broke down earlier in May. DWS has also had preliminary discussions with Amundi and Axa SA, according to people with knowledge of the matter. Swiss money manager GAM Holding meanwhile is reviving attempts to sell itself, a process that stalled as the firm struggled to contain the fallout from a scandal involving a former bond trader. In the U.S., Invesco took a $5.7 billion bet on the future of active management with its acquisition of OppenheimerFunds Inc. from Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. OppenheimerFunds is known for its active management business.
“In the end, it’s been a rough few years for the active managers and will likely continue in that way for the traditional asset managers who have not shifted strategy to take advantage of the more in-vogue asset classes,” said Sumeet Mody, director of equity research at Sandler O’Neill. “The managers who have been underperforming will likely have to close up shop or look for a good acquirer to take them over.”
Casey Quirk’s Phillips said the most likely targets fall into two batches. Those with specialties in areas like private markets, infrastructure and active fixed income will look increasingly attractive to acquirers, because those skill sets are in higher demand. Other potential targets will simply offer the opportunity to build scale while saving costs, he said.
Region:
U.S.
Europe
2018
flows
Operating margin (%)
0
20
40
60
80
$15B
Eaton
Vance
10
Man
Group
Azimut
Holding
5
Federated
Investors
0
Manning
& Napier
Diamond
Hill Capital
Gamco
−5
Artisan
Partners
Wisdom
Tree
−10
Companies
sized by AUM:
$500B
−15
$100B
Schroders
$10B
Janus
Henderson
−20
Region:
U.S.
Europe
2018
flows
Operating margin (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
$15B
Less profitable but growing
More profitable and growing
Eaton
Vance
10
Attractive for buyers seeking new investor money and willing to pay a premium for profitability.
Rathbone
Brothers
Man
Group
Azimut
Holding
5
Vontobel
Holding
Federated
Investors
Pzena
Investment
Brooks
Macdonald
0
Manning
& Napier
Diamond
Hill Capital
Cohen
& Steers
Gamco
−5
Artisan
Partners
Companies sized by AUM:
Wisdom
Tree
$500B
$100B
−10
Waddell
& Reed
$10B
Medium-sized as a target and a potential buyer itself, with recent outflows to worry about.
−15
Schroders
Less profitable and shrinking
More profitable but shrinking
Janus
Henderson
−20
Region:
U.S.
Europe
2018
flows
Operating margin (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
$15B
Less profitable but growing
More profitable and growing
Man
Group
Eaton
Vance
Attractive for buyers seeking new investor money and willing to pay a premium for profitability.
10
Rathbone
Brothers
Vontobel
Holding
Azimut
Holding
5
Pzena
Investment
Brooks
Macdonald
Federated
Investors
0
Manning
& Napier
Diamond
Hill Capital
Gamco
Cohen
& Steers
−5
Artisan
Partners
Wisdom
Tree
Companies sized by AUM:
$500B
−10
Waddell
& Reed
$100B
$10B
Medium-sized as a target and a potential buyer itself, with recent outflows to worry about.
Schroders
−15
Janus
Henderson
Less profitable and shrinking
More profitable but shrinking
−20
Region:
U.S.
Europe
2018 flows
Operating margin (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
$15B
Less profitable but growing
More profitable and growing
Man Group
Attractive for buyers seeking new investor money and willing to pay a premium for profitability.
Eaton Vance
10
Rathbone Brothers
Companies sized by AUM:
Vontobel Holding
$500B
Azimut Holding
5
$100B
Pzena Investment
Brooks Macdonald
$10B
Federated Investors
0
Manning & Napier
Diamond Hill Capital
Gamco
Cohen & Steers
−5
Artisan Partners
WisdomTree
−10
Waddell & Reed
Schroders
Medium-sized as a target and a potential buyer itself, with recent outflows to worry about.
−15
Janus Henderson
Less profitable and shrinking
More profitable but shrinking
−20
As the business of managing money is being upended, the heyday of Lynch, Miller and Gross is receding further into the past. In their scramble for survival and under consistent fee pressure, firms are being forced to adapt. Many will be absorbed by other bigger competitors, some will disappear altogether and almost all will need to either cut costs or hone their strategies to increase profit in these uncertain times.
“Asset managers know they need to change,” said Christian Burgin, who previously worked at Standard Life Investments before co-founding Visible Capital, a technology start-up servicing advisers, wealth managers, platforms and funds. “They’re trying, but are finding it difficult.”