Paul Ryan's Republican Ghetto
Since his swearing-in as House speaker, Paul Ryan has maintained his sunny, gung-ho disposition, hobnobbing with his party's guerrillas while gently trying to lure them back to the comforts of civilization.
Wouldn't it be fun to have a comprehensive legislative agenda? Some trinkets for the "accomplishments" page of their campaign web sites? Maybe even a shiny new budget?
On Thursday, Ryan acknowledged what already seemed apparent: He doesn't have the Republican votes to pass a budget. He still intends to roll out something Republicans can run on while they're busy running away from Donald Trump in the fall. But the chances this program will rise above the demands of short-term propaganda seem slim. Ryan's once ballyhooed Path to Prosperity is looking like a rocky road.
His predecessor, John Boehner, tried to manage the role of responsible political adult while accommodating the GOP's angry rebels. He never found a balance, and the House Freedom Caucus finally cooked Boehner in a pot and washed him down with the acid residue of Trump wine.
Yet Boehner's job was vastly easier than Ryan's. Because Boehner wasn't running for president, he could afford to mimic Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell's maximum obstruction and unrelenting partisanship. Legislation was reserved for expressions of tribalism and the flaunting of symbols. Time and again Boehner approved the wild ones' favorite game -- Kill the Obamacare! He let party nativists take over immigration policy, making mass deportation the default position of House Republicans. Everyone ran wild and free.
It's hard to position yourself for president in such an environment. As chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Ryan benefited from his party's juvenile obsessions and general haplessness. In a party increasingly defined by hostility to ideas, there was less than robust competition for the role of House intellectual. What's more, Ryan could propose all manner of jarring fiscal engineering secure in the knowledge that institutional dysfunction would prevent it from ever reaching the president's desk, much less becoming law.
Under Boehner, Ryan appeared to be a victim of GOP incompetence. As speaker, he is now at the head of it. Voters may not grasp the nuances of congressional power. But they're pretty sure it's a mess. Voter disapproval of congressional Republicans consistently runs about three times higher than approval.
With his gaze raised to 2020 (and one distracted eye fixed sideways on the party's national convention in July), how does Ryan persuade people to let him lead the nation if he can't persuade the Republican conference to let him lead the House?
Ryan has invested heavily in courting the conservatives most eager to stop the 21st century in its tracks. But obstruction is an unpromising route to the White House. He can't claim to be presidential timber come 2019 by virtue of having accomplished nothing.
That seems to leave him with two options should Hillary Clinton gain the presidency. Either Ryan manages to rally the conservative ultras behind conservative legislation that Clinton vetoes. Or he stiffs the ultras and works with the mainstream in his party and Democrats to pass more moderate fare.
The first would require him to pass the kind of bills -- whether in the form of assaults on popular programs such as Planned Parenthood, tax cuts for the wealthy or cuts to the safety net for the poor -- that are unlikely to endear him to a general electorate. Meanwhile, Clinton's inevitable vetoes would raise doubts about Ryan's effectiveness. He wouldn't be obstructing, but he wouldn't be getting anything enacted either.
The latter option, working with Democrats, would enable him to showcase moderation, effectiveness and a bipartisan flair that could soften the sharp edges of the Armageddon budgets that he once produced as Budget Committee chairman. However, renouncing tribalism has not been a good career move in Republican politics. Right-wing media would declare Ryan a traitor. The Freedom Caucus would revolt. Ryan, like, Boehner, would likely end up in the soup.
Ryan can't keep beating the dead horse of obstruction. And he can't sell out the Freedom Caucus without the consent of the rest of his jittery conference. For his ambition's sake, House conservatives will need a change of heart, powered by a change of incentives.
There's only so much Ryan can do about that. Conservative voters haven't punished House Republicans for accomplishing too little in recent years, or for being too extreme. Just the opposite. For Ryan to break out of the conservative ghetto that trapped Boehner, Republican voters are going to have to decide to set him free.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Francis Wilkinson at firstname.lastname@example.org
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Katy Roberts at email@example.com