Hackers Take $1 Billion a Year as Banks Blame Their Clients
Valiena Allison got a call from her bank on a busy morning two years ago about a wire transfer from her company’s account. She told the managers she hadn’t approved the transfer. The problem was, her computer had.
As Allison, chief executive officer of Sterling Heights, Michigan-based Experi-Metal Inc., was to learn, her company computer was approving other transfers as she spoke. During hours of frantic phone calls with her bank, Allison, 45, was unable to stop this cybercrime in progress as transfer followed transfer. By day’s end, $5.2 million was gone.
She turned to her bank, a branch of Comerica Inc. (CMA), to help recover the money for her metal-products firm. It got all but $561,000 of the funds. Then came the surprise: the bank said the loss was Experi-Metal’s problem because it had allowed Allison’s computer to be infected by the hackers.
“At the end of the day, the fraud department at Comerica said: ‘What’s wrong with you? How could you let this happen?’” Allison said.
In increments of a few thousand dollars to a few million per theft, cybercrooks are stealing as much as $1 billion a year from small and mid-sized bank accounts in the U.S. and Europe like Experi-Metal, according to Don Jackson, a security expert at Dell SecureWorks. And account holders are the big losers.
‘Losing More Now’
“I think they’re losing more now than to the James Gang and Bonnie and Clyde and the rest of the famous gangs combined,” said U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, a Rhode Island Democrat who chaired a Select Committee on Intelligence task force on U.S. cybersecurity in 2010.
Organized criminal gangs, operating mostly out of Eastern Europe, target small companies, school districts and local governments that maintain fat commercial bank accounts protected by rudimentary security measures at community or regional banks. The accounts typically aren’t covered by insurance as individual accounts are.
“If everyone knew their money was at risk in small and medium-sized banks, they would move their accounts to JPMorgan Chase,” said James Woodhill, a venture capitalist who is leading an effort to get smaller banks to upgrade anti-fraud security for their online banking programs.
“Chase has invested substantially in fraud prevention and detection capabilities for our clients,” Patrick Linehan, a JPMorgan spokesman, said in an e-mail. “If there is fraud on an account, we work with our clients on a case-by-case basis.”
Smaller banks as well as many of the victims tend not to make the thefts public, according to interviews with the customers and experts such as Woodhill. As the threat becomes better known, small-business customers and other target entities may shift their business to large, national banks, which can better absorb the losses to maintain customer relations and which have better security policies to protect clients from such crimes.
“It’s frightening for small businesses because they have no clue about this,” said Avivah Litan, an analyst at Stamford, Connecticut-based Gartner Inc., which does computer analysis. “They just don’t have any clue, and everyone expects their bank to protect them. Businesses are not equipped to deal with this problem, and banks are barely equipped.”
Customers used to being made whole when they are victims of credit-card fraud or ATM thefts have had to sue small and medium-size banks to recover losses after being blamed by their branches for permitting the crime, as Allison was.
The traditional help of law enforcement hasn’t been there either for such customers. In the heyday of bank robberies in the 1930s, the FBI became famous for Tommy-gun shootouts with the bad guys, who were put on the Most Wanted list. In most cases, the identities of the John Dillingers and Pretty Boy Floyds of the 21st Century aren’t known because of online anonymity, and the bureau doesn’t disclose statistics on how much these cybercrooks are stealing.
Victims in the last two years have ranged from Green Ford Sales, a car dealership in Abilene, Kansas, to Golden State Bridge Inc., a construction company in California wine country. No need to use a mask or gun. These criminals can steal millions from the comfort of their homes dressed in their pajamas.
The crime profits can be staggering and the risks minimal. Jackson, the security expert, said three sophisticated gangs each haul in at least $100 million a year. That dwarfs the $43 million taken in all conventional bank heists in the U.S. last year, from stick-ups to burglaries, according to the FBI.
A $100 Million Hit
“A $100 million hit on a bank or a series of banks,” Whitehouse said. “That’s a pretty big bank robbery. And it doesn’t even make the press. It just trickles through in FBI tip sheets.”
To law enforcement officials, cybercrime is a new priority. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Secret Service, which has jurisdiction over financial crimes, have boosted manpower to combat computer-enabled robberies and have formed partnerships with foreign law-enforcement agencies.
Those efforts have been swamped by the explosion in e- commerce, said Chris Swecker, a former FBI assistant director who advises companies on cybersecurity. As millions of customers have shifted online, criminals have followed, their hacking tools and nimble criminal organizations racing ahead of old- school law enforcement models.
“Through cybercrime, transnational criminal organizations pose a significant threat to financial and trust systems,” including banking, stock markets and credit-card services, according to a National Security Council report issued in July.
National Security Threat
Cybercrime has risen to the level of a national security threat, according to the report, citing a “critical shortage of investigators with the knowledge and expertise to analyze the ever increasing amounts of potential digital evidence.”
The banking industry’s reluctance to confront this problem head-on has allowed criminals to reinvest some of their booty to create better, more effective malicious software, known as malware, according to Woodhill.
Malware is what hurt Earl Goossen, business manager for Green Ford Sales, when he logged on to the company’s payroll account at First Bank Kansas at 7:45 a.m. central standard time on Nov. 3, 2010. Just two days earlier he’d used his computer to arrange for the bank to send out the $63,000 payroll to employee accounts. Everything went smoothly at first. Goossen responded to a follow-up e-mail request from First Bank Kansas to okay the payroll, just as he did on the 1st and 15th of every month.
Unbeknownst to Goossen, malicious software had infected the computer with a so-called worm, which had the ability to grab passwords, user names and credit-card data.
Some malware allows hackers thousands of miles away to take remote control of machines it infects, as if they were sitting at the keyboard. This malware is affordable and easy to obtain. A basic version sells for less than $5,000, Jackson said. Many models, licensed like commercial software from Microsoft Corp. and Adobe Systems Inc., even come with tech support, he said.
The worm on Goossen’s machine allowed thieves to log onto the website of the auto dealer’s bank using Goossen’s credentials and set up a second payroll batch for the usual amount for nine non-existent employees. The additional payroll was sent out overnight by First Bank.
The software allowed the hackers to grab Goossen’s e-mail password and banking details. All they had to do was change the notification e-mail address to a name under their control.
When an amount like Green Ford’s $63,000 is taken from a bank by gun-toting robbers, the FBI would typically dispatch special agents to cordon off the crime scene and interview witnesses. No agents arrived in Abilene on Nov. 4, and no one at the company was ever interviewed by the bureau about the theft.
Green Ford’s owner, Lease Duckwall, filled out a report with local police, who don’t have a cybercrime unit. The Kansas Bureau of Investigation examined his computer and found nothing of use. Frustrated, Duckwall turned detective, interviewing bank employees, victims of similar crimes and whoever knew anything about cybertheft. In the end, the trail went cold.
Representatives of the FBI and the Secret Service insist they are not overwhelmed.
“I don’t think it’s right to conclude that because there are not a lot of arrests that law enforcement is not doing its job,” said Gordon Snow, the FBI’s assistant director of the cyber division.
The FBI and Secret Service have increased the number of agents dedicated to fighting cybercrime. Last September, as part of “Operation Trident Beach,” U.S. prosecutors in Manhattan arrested a gang of money mules in connection with a wide-ranging cyberfraud ring that had stolen $70 million from banks and tried to grab another $150 million in the U.S. and Western Europe. No ringleader was arrested, even though five were questioned by police in Ukraine, according to the FBI.
The inability to put handcuffs on suspects in Eastern Europe is a source of frustration for law enforcement, according to representatives of the FBI and Secret Service.
“We can’t let that stop us from continuing to move forward,” said Pablo Martinez, who heads the cybercrime unit at the Secret Service. “You have to go after every target.”
Mules, used by hackers as cutouts, are an obvious target, even the unwitting ones. When thieves stole the money from Duckwall’s dealership, some of the money first went to Shawn Young’s account in upstate New York. Young thought it was a legitimate transaction -- at first.
Young, 35, was officially an assistant manager for R.E. Company Back Office. He got his job in October through a Careerbuilder website ad that said an Australian office services company was looking to expand into New York state. He was selected to scout locations in the Binghamton area. It did seem odd his new employer never asked for his Social Security number, he said in an interview.
Part of his job was to transfer payments made by some of the company’s U.S.-based clients to various programmers. He corresponded with his boss, Samantha Simons, exclusively through the company’s intranet site.
At 8:45 a.m. on Nov. 3, Young got his first payment-related assignment. He logged into the R.E. Company Back Office intranet site and learned from his supervisors that $4,975 had been deposited into his account at M&T Bank in Endicott, New York. The sender was Green Ford Sales.
His boss said he could keep $145 of the money if he acted quickly. Within 10 minutes, he withdrew the funds and drove to the closest Western Union Co. (WU) office, a few miles away. Young pulled into the Western Union parking lot and his cell phone rang. It was a manager from the M&T Bank branch where he’d made the withdrawal. She said the bank had discovered the wire transfer wasn’t authorized. It was only then that Young realized something might be wrong, he said.
On his way back the bank, his phone rang again. It was Simons, calling from a Syracuse telephone area code to see if there was a problem with the transfer. Young, who had never spoken with his boss, told her he’d been asked to return the funds. In a matter-of-fact manner, Simons said OK and hung up, he said.
After learning from his bank that the wire transfer from Green Ford had been unauthorized, Young tried to log into the R.E. Company Bank Office website, but his access had been terminated.
“I was lucky I did not send the money,” Young said. “I dodged a bullet there.”
Christine Palmer wasn’t as fortunate. In February, the single mother from New Britain, Connecticut who moonlights as the manager of a band, Enemy Remains, applied for a position advertised on Careerbuilder.com.
A woman named “Jennifer” from CS Office Services called to say she had the job, a flexible gig that paid by the assignment and required her to help process transactions.
On March 3, after a few weeks of online training, Palmer woke up to find that $98,000 had been deposited into her account at Bank of America Corp. (BAC) An e-mail instructed her to withdraw $9,000 in cash and wire it to three individuals in the Ukraine via Western Union.
Then, Palmer was to transfer the rest of the funds to a Ukrainian bank account. As a fee, Palmer could keep $1,800 of the total. Before she’d completed the wire transfer, a man with an Eastern European accent called, urging her to speed things up.
“He sounded very concerned, which made me think I was going to lose my job,” Palmer said.
It wasn’t until a few days later, when Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America halted the wire transfer and told her the funds had been stolen, that Palmer realized CS Office Services didn’t really exist, and that her employers were part of a criminal scheme.
Bank of America closed Palmer’s account and told her she was responsible for paying back the $9,000 she’d wired overseas.
Palmer said she no longer looks for jobs advertised on web sites.
Unwitting money mules aren’t the only ones to have gotten wake-up calls in the new world of bank cybercrime. Customers sometimes find their friendly bank has become an adversary, quoting the fine print of account contracts about who is responsible for what.
On May 7, 2009, cyberthieves hacked into the bank account of Patco Construction Inc., based in Sanford, Maine, and initiated a series of wire transfers totaling $56,594. Some transfers bounced back, causing Ocean Bank to send owner Mark Patterson a routine return notice via the U.S. Postal Service.
Over the next several days, the crooks continued to transfer money out of Patco’s account, removing almost $500,000 before Patterson received the mailed letter from Ocean Bank. The bank eventually recovered a portion of the transfers, leaving Patco with a loss of $345,444, according to Patterson.
Patterson said Ocean Bank rebuffed his attempts to reach a settlement, so in January 2010 he sued. He argued the bank should have done a better job monitoring the company’s bank account. Ocean Bank argued that its protections were “commercially reasonable,” in keeping with general guidance issued by the U.S. banking industry in 2005.
U.S. District Judge D. Brock Hornby in Portland affirmed the magistrate’s decision today.
The magistrate’s ruling infuriated Woodhill, who co-founded Authentify, a cybersecurity firm, in 1999. He is trying to change the law governing liability in hacking cases.
“I can’t fathom how one could consider a security procedure that makes it easy for people to steal money from school districts, churches and small businesses to be commercially reasonable,” Woodhill said.
Woodhill faulted banks for downplaying or hiding the scope of bank heists, a posture he attributes to fear of undermining confidence in an online banking system that saves financial institutions tens of millions of dollars a year in transactions that don’t have to be processed by a human teller.
Last year, Woodhill came to the rescue of Karen McCarthy, whose marketing firm was victimized by hackers in February 2010. McCarthy, who made one wire transfer on the same day every month, for $1,000, noticed a problem with her computer on Feb. 10. The screen had turned blue and appeared frozen, while other computers in her firm seemed to function normally.
In the weeks leading up to the frozen-screen episode, McCarthy had reached an agreement to sell her firm, Little & King. She’d bought out her lease, sold her office equipment and supplies and was preparing to join the new company as an employee, leaving behind the worries of business ownership.
After her computer froze, she printed out statements from Toronto Dominion Bank in preparation for the sale of her company. Over the Feb. 13-15 Presidents Day weekend, she couldn’t figure out discrepancies between recent bank statements and the amount in her company’s checking account. Finally, on the Monday evening, a national holiday, she checked her online banking account and saw five unauthorized wire transfers.
She called TD Bank in a panic. Because of the holiday, she was told no one was available. The next morning she marched into her TD Bank branch, in Massapequa, New York, and asked an assistant manager for help.
Calls Not Returned
At first the manager told her the bank would get her money back, she said. Once it became clear the funds were stolen, the bank stopped returning her calls, McCarthy said.
The theft derailed the sale of McCarthy’s company, forcing her to raid her children’s college funds for needed cash. Of the $164,000 stripped from her account, TD Bank recovered almost $95,000, leaving her about $70,000 in the hole -- and without an office or equipment, she said.
When she learned TD Bank was to hold a fraud-prevention seminar on May 13, 2010, in Burlington, Vermont, she hopped on a plane and slipped into the meeting. During the morning presentation, when an expert in wire transactions was talking about ways that small businesses could protect themselves from the dangers posed by cybercriminals, McCarthy raised her hand.
Why wasn’t TD Bank doing a better job protecting its small- business clients, she asked. How had TD Bank allowed $164,000 to be wired out of her account even though she hardly every made wire transfers? As the speaker tried to respond, McCarthy kept peppering him with questions about his bank’s responsibilities to its clients.
Let’s Talk Outside
Two bank representatives, including TD Bank’s head of corporate security and investigations, walked over to McCarthy’s table and suggested they continue the subject outside. McCarthy told the head of security it was good to meet him finally, since she’d been calling him for weeks following the robbery and had never gotten through.
Jennifer Morneau, a spokeswoman for TD Bank, confirmed that there was such an incident involving a “woman from Long Island” at one of its anti-fraud seminars, and didn’t have any further information.
“We constantly monitor and assess the security of our systems,” Morneau said in an e-mailed statement. “We also believe that educating our customers is one of the best ways to help them defend against online fraud and identity theft, because even the best security measures can only prevent fraud if customers are also vigilant about employing the necessary safeguards to protect their information.”
With Woodhill’s support, McCarthy started a website she calls www.yourmoneyisnotsafeinthebank.org and has organized other cybercrime small-business victims across the country. In industry presentations, Woodhill uses her as an example in describing what’s wrong with online banking and the current rules governing the commercial accounts of small businesses.
“If every small-business account holder in America knew what Karen McCarthy had gone through, there would be a run on the banks,” he said.
Last year Woodhill supported a proposed law, introduced by U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer, a New York Democrat, that would have extended protections enjoyed by individual bank depositors to publicly funded entities such as school districts and town governments. Congress adjourned before any vote was taken.
Woodhill is now pushing for a federal law that would require regional and community banks to warn their commercial clients explicitly of the dangers of cyber fraud. He’s hired former Louisiana congressman Billy Tauzin, a Democrat turned Republican who chaired the House Energy & Commerce committee, to represent him.
The American Banking Association has opposed attempts to extend cyberfraud protection from depositors to small-business clients. Until recently, the association’s position has prevailed.
Then came the Experi-Metal lawsuit brought by Valiena Allison against Dallas-based Comerica. In June, U.S. District Judge Patrick J. Duggan ruled in Detroit in favor of Allison and Experi-Metal, agreeing Comerica’s response to the fraud didn’t meet standards of good faith and fair dealing. Comerica agreed to pay Allison almost the entire amount stolen.
Other cybercrime victims have taken note of this precedent, said Brian Krebs, who has written about the Little & King case and other cyberthefts on his blog (www.krebsonsecurity.com).
Village View, an escrow company based in Redondo Beach, California, that was robbed of $465,558 by cyberthieves in March of 2010, sued Professional Business Bank just two weeks after the Experi-Metal decision.
“Banks don’t like to sue their customers and customers don’t like to sue their banks,” he said. “When disputes occur, it’s best to try to work together for an appropriate result.”
Woodhill said the banking industry is behind the curve on this matter, just as it was in 1978 when it opposed the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, which protects consumer bank deposits from fraud.
“That’s one of the biggest favors Congress ever did for banks, even though they were against it,” he said. “Banks truly do not understand what their own interests are. Corporate lobbyists only play defense.”
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Michael Hytha at email@example.com