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No Big Boy Pants for Banks That Whine Over Rules

Illustration by Sang Mun Close

Illustration by Sang Mun

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Illustration by Sang Mun

Let’s imagine the customers of a financial firm get word that more than a billion dollars of their money is missing. Then, less than a year later, customers of another firm learn that $200 million of their money is gone, too.

If such a sequence of events occurred, it’s likely that leaders from the industry would be called to appear before a government committee. And they would probably say something like:

Sorry, folks. But don’t try to slap us with expensive new rules.

Welcome to the era of financial regulation, cost-benefit style -- emphasis on the costs, not the benefits.

Although it seems to have escaped the memories of the people in charge on Wall Street, the economy just about collapsed in 2008, and a lot of bad things followed. Credit froze, financial firms went under, and millions of people were thrown out of work as business owners lost their financing and their confidence.

Then, last October, that billion-dollars-gone-missing scenario came to pass. The commodities firm MF Global Holdings Ltd. (MFGLQ) declared bankruptcy after customer money got transferred to a corporate account and then disappeared. Last month, customers of an Iowa futures trading firm, Peregrine Financial Group Inc., found out they had lost $200 million after the firm’s chief executive officer said in a suicide note that he had been running a Ponzi scheme for 20 years.

Government Obligations

Which brings us to the obligatory government hearing.

Last month, the House Committee on Agriculture explored what it cryptically referred to as “Recent Events (that would be the lost customer money) and Impending Regulatory Reforms (which better not be too expensive).” Among those testifying were two futures industry leaders: Terrence A. Duffy, president of CME Group Inc., the world’s largest futures market, and Walter L. Lukken, CEO of the Futures Industry Association, a Washington-based trade group.

The two men made the requisite noises about ramping up the industry’s vigilance against fraud. Then both took the opportunity to get it on the record that there’s a more important agenda.

Duffy: “I would hate to see us get over-regulated to a point or have rules put upon us that put us in a very -- a place that is very anti-competitive.” At a Senate hearing yesterday, he said he wasn’t opposed to an insurance fund for fraud victims “if people want to pay for it.”

Lukken: “It would be wise to carefully weigh the costs of any new regulatory mandates.” Some of the rules being proposed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission could lead to market disruption, the exit of futures brokers from the business, and - - as if it were the customer we really cared about here -- the limiting of customer choice, Lukken said.

There was a glimmer of hope after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act two years ago that lawmakers had put some measures in place to avert another financial disaster. To get the reforms up and running, though, government agencies first had to write rules that would execute the law’s objectives.

The financial industry has used many tactics to derail this process, but its standout victory was a 2010 lawsuit by the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce against the Securities and Exchange Commission, which had proposed a rule to make it easier for investors to oust corporate directors. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington said last July that the SEC hadn’t properly assessed the rule’s costs and benefits. It was “an aggressive stretch of the law” in the view of John Coffee, a securities law professor at Columbia University.

Getting Stuck

A stretch or not, it is what the SEC is stuck with for the moment, and it’s become “the cornerstone of the attack of regulatory reform in the courts,” according to an 82-page report released three days ago by the investor advocacy group Better Markets. Dodd-Frank was passed “to stop Wall Street from crashing the world again,” Dennis Kelleher, the group’s president, said in a telephone interview. “Now they’re saying they can’t do it if it costs them too much money.”

To get an idea of who has the upper hand in this fight, consider what it entails to be the chump who has to explain the “benefits” side of financial regulation. Costs can be easy to figure out. Say there’s a regulation that requires new compliance officers. Tally up the salaries. If there’s an assortment of new software you need to comply with Dodd-Frank’s reporting requirements, you call the computer vendors and get the numbers.

But how do you measure benefits, like the frauds that never happen because stricter rules are in place? Is there a dollar figure we can put on credit markets that don’t collapse? Or the elderly who don’t lose their life savings because regulators have cracked down on rip-off artists who troll retirement villages?

Those are important questions, but they aren’t the ones being asked at Washington hearings that have titles like “The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis,” which took place April 17 before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

One witness that day from the Cambridge, Massachusetts- based research group Committee on Capital Markets Regulation had this suggestion for financial regulators looking to get the cost-benefit equation right: If a regulator isn’t able to develop data for its cost-benefit analysis internally, it should get the numbers from third parties such as trade organizations. If that doesn’t work, the agency should try to get the information directly from the firms that will be affected by the regulations. (Whom I’m sure will be anxious to help the SEC get a new rule in place.) Inconveniencing financial firms with such requests, though, could be burdensome for the firms, the witness said, so overseers should make data requests “with an eye to minimizing the imposition on and disruption to” the firms they regulate.

See? Easy!

The object of this exercise, of course, is to swamp regulators with so much cost-benefit work that rule-making will be impossible.

To keep the SEC busy, one proponent of cost-benefit analysis showed up at that House Oversight hearing in April with a nifty checklist for the SEC. J.W. Verret, an assistant professor at George Mason University’s law school, said in his testimony that when the SEC proposes a rule, it should estimate the impact on job creation. And gross domestic product. And whether U.S. stock exchanges will lose listings to overseas rivals. While we’re at it, let’s just have the SEC “retract and re-propose” the Dodd-Frank rules the agency has completed, and start all over again with a new cost analysis, he said.

By the time the SEC is done with that, it should be time for a flash crash, a couple of London whale copycats, maybe another MF Global or two. Then we can start the whole re- regulation argument all over again, if there’s anything left to argue about.

(Susan Antilla, who has written about Wall Street and business for three decades and is the author of “Tales From the Boom-Boom Room,” a book about sexual harassment at financial companies, is a Bloomberg View columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.)

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Today’s highlights: the editors on success for female Saudi Olympians and on what the ECB must do to save the euro; Caroline Baum on monetary policy getting off track; Michael Kinsley on Romney’s zero tolerance for the unsuccessful; Peter Orszag on ways to keep lowering health-care costs; Handel Reynolds on the shaky foundation of the mammogram economy.

To contact the writer of this article: Susan Antilla at santilla@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this article: James Greiff at jgreiff@bloomberg.net.

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