Mark Gilbert
Mark Gilbert, London's bureau chief for Bloomberg News, poses for a photograph in London, on Sept. 15, 2009. Photographer: Chris Ratcliffe/Bloomberg
Since its inception, the derivatives
market has echoed the fairground hawkers’ call to “scream if
you want to go faster.” Among the new derivatives,
collateralized-debt obligations (CDOs) were particularly hot.
To make a CDO, bankers bundle together a package of other
kinds of securities, such as corporate bonds, asset-backed
securities (ABSs) or credit-default swaps (CDSs) that are tied
to company creditworthiness or mortgage performance.
By carving the resulting collections into slices of
differing quality, the creators can make the riskiest portions
absorb any losses on the underlying assets first, thereby
cushioning the higher-rated slices.
No Clear Idea
As with almost every other investment vehicle, CDOs were
designed to reward investors according to the amount of risk
they took. Those who bought lower-risk securities typically
earned a smaller rate of return from successful investments than
did those who took bigger risks, who received either a larger
payoff if the investment performed well or nothing at all if the
investment failed.
Trouble was, no one had a clear idea of just how risky any
given slice was or any sense of how to quantify and value that
risk.
In the same way that Liverpudlians disguise overripe meat
and vegetables by cooking them to mush in a stew called scouse,
investment banks, rating companies and plain old market peer
pressure turned the investments inside most CDOs from inedible
chunks of the financial markets into bite-size morsels palatable
to pension fund trustees.
No pension fund -- and only a few other investors -- would
buy a structured transaction whose worth depends on what happens
to the stock market and company creditworthiness, which way
commodity prices go and whether the wind blows on a Sunday. They
did, however, happily purchase CDOs that offered strong credit
ratings and the promise of top-flight returns.
Risk Appetite
For the game to work, everyone involved had to turn a blind
eye to the less-than-stellar track record assembled by the
rating companies that assessed CDOs.
And they did -- until CDOs’ poor performance became
impossible to ignore. Of the CDOs that started with AAA ratings
in January 2002, 16 percent had lost that top grade by November
2004. Almost 14 percent of second-tier (AA-rated) securities
were cut, and nearly 17 percent of CDOs with third-tier (A-
rated) grades were cut.
Those early CDOs, which typically contained vanilla
corporate bonds, were hurt by a swift deterioration in average
creditworthiness, combined with some hefty one-off defaults,
including those of Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc.
Demand Soars
Memories, though, proved short, and demand for CDOs soared
as credit-rating cuts on corporate debt became rarer. (The
economy was growing, and most companies had enough cash to cover
their debts.)
In 2004 in Europe alone, Moody’s rated $56 billion in
European collateralized debt backed by default swaps. That was a
20 percent gain over the previous year, according to figures
provided by the company at the start of 2005.
By 2006, the derivatives printing presses were stamping out
$503 billion of collateralized debt for the rating companies to
grade, up from $274 billion in the previous year and $144
billion in 2004.
In April 2007, Moody’s announced a fourth-quarter profit
increase of 20 percent, as revenue from rating structured-
finance transactions leaped to $251.5 million, a 44 percent gain
over the same period in 2006. Almost half of Moody’s total 2007
sales of $583 million came from its structured-notes business,
dwarfing the $115 million it made by analyzing company
creditworthiness.
Fatally Flawed
Risk appetites increased, and CDOs became even more exotic
and complicated. Structured-product specialists worked to
broaden their appeal by tying CDO values to a broader range of
underlying markets, some even creating theoretical bets that
were tied to abstract prices.
To grade these new financial instruments, rating companies
used methodology that was fatally flawed from the start. It was
based on induction, the process of inferring a general law or
principle from the observation of particular instances. But the
particular instances the rating companies chose did not
incorporate the lessons of previous housing booms, nor the
nonexistent histories of some new, theoretical bets.
Instead, rating companies used the brief price history of
the derivatives market as a benchmark to assess its likely
future price performance.
Indigestion
The most egregious example of derivative market excess came
with the invention of the constant-proportion debt obligation,
known as a CPDO. In June 2006, Dutch bank ABN Amro Holding NV
issued a 38-page marketing brochure describing a security called
Surf: “the first CPDO; a breakthrough in credit investments.”
CPDOs were the credit derivatives market’s hottest
alchemical method for transforming plumbous yield premiums into
the gold of market-beating returns. The marketing literature and
associated research reports suggested that the newfangled
securities were the holy grail of investing -- heads, you win;
tails, you don’t lose.
CPDOs were an abstract bet on the likelihood of defaults in
the corporate bond market. With their values tied to credit-
default-swap indexes, the securities promised to deliver as much
as 2 percentage points more than money market rates during their
10-year life spans.
That was worth about 5.6 percent at the three-month money
market rates that prevailed when CPDOs began attracting
attention in November 2006.
Alphabet Soup
At the time, German government debt, deemed the safest
fixed-income investments in the European markets, yielded just
3.7 percent annually. No wonder CPDOs looked irresistible.
Those remarkable rates of return were made possible by the
magic of derivatives, which leveraged the initial bet by a
multiplier of 15.
The leverage turned average punters into high rollers with
the potential for fantastic gains -- and losses. When times were
good and a CPDO looked set to meet its payment obligations,
sponsoring investment banks could reduce their market bets.
When times got tougher, banks increased those wagers to
boost the security’s net asset value. Credit-rating companies
issued CPDOs top ratings for both interest and principal
payments.
The alphabet soup cooked up by the derivatives chefs --
boil some CDOs, toss in a dash of ABSs and a soupcon of CDSs,
season with CPDOs and serve with a garnish of overly optimistic
ratings -- was sufficiently toxic to poison the entire financial
system.
Just Deserts
Capitalism itself ended up looking sickly and anemic.
Belatedly, investors discovered the truth of one of billionaire
investor Warren Buffett’s aphorisms: Unraveling a derivatives
trade, the so-called Oracle of Omaha had said, was like trying
to carry “a cat home by its tail.”
Wall Street had invented a machine that could recycle just
about anything that generated a cash flow. It had a growing,
reliable source of supply from the housing market, sufficient to
keep the merry-go-round spinning. And shifts in both the
investment banking culture and the investing landscape created a
willing coalition of buyers and sellers.
To contact the writer:
Mark Gilbert in London at
magilbert@bloomberg.net