Bloomberg Anywhere Remote Login Bloomberg Terminal Demo Request


Connecting decision makers to a dynamic network of information, people and ideas, Bloomberg quickly and accurately delivers business and financial information, news and insight around the world.


Financial Products

Enterprise Products


Customer Support

  • Americas

    +1 212 318 2000

  • Europe, Middle East, & Africa

    +44 20 7330 7500

  • Asia Pacific

    +65 6212 1000


Industry Products

Media Services

Follow Us

Bloomberg Customers


Security Hole Striptease

The success of "SQLSpida," the worm that targets MS-SQL servers set upon the

Net with a blank "SA" password, is testament to how badly basic security

education is still needed.

As always, I place primary blame on the administrators of these

boxes-leaving the SA password blank on any installation is a rookie move.

To do so on a production machine placed on the Internet is just plain

stupid. You have probably guessed that my use of "primary" infers a

secondary party in responsibility; and indeed it does: Microsoft.

Microsoft has been riding the fence between marketing a concept of

"trustworthy computing" and delivering a product that caters to the least

common technically proficient denominator. Most products have been

specifically designed to allow anyone who can click "Next" to perform a

successful installation, but when it comes to their defense of insecure

default software settings, they have a matter-of-fact way of telling

everyone that they should know better.

For instance, Microsoft knows that the default application extension

mappings in IIS are deadly, and we are blamed for not removing or remapping

them; yet they are all enabled by default, and one must drill down deep into

the interface to turn them off. In default installations of SQL, the SA

user can perform remote system-level functions, yet they allow the password

to be blank, and they don't even give us the functionality of renaming the

account. Administrators are expected to set proper ACL's on system files,

but even in their Advanced Server product, Microsoft assumes the admin to be

so inept that Windows Explorer hides the contents of the WINNT directory so

that the user won't monkey with them.

It is time for Microsoft to start shipping products with more secure default

settings, and to require a certain level of expertise from the

administrators of these systems.

VENDOR NOTIFICATION ALERTS. But safer out-of-the-box settings are not the only thing we need -- clouds

continue to billow on the vulnerability landscape. Too many software

vendors are so busy working on the Next Big Thing that they are

unnecessarily putting their customers at risk by sitting on security patches

for their current products.

If you are not familiar with David Litchfield or Next Generation Security Software,

then you should be. Litchfield probably has the world record for

discovering the most buffer overflows. And like many other security

professionals, he won't disclose details of his exploits to the public until

the vendor can release a patch.

But how long is one to wait for the vendor the get their act together? How

long must customers' systems lay in wait of exploitation before a patch is


Last month, Litchfield discovered a remotely exploitable vulnerability in

Sun's iPlanet. Though Sun has already developed a patch for this critical

issue, Litchfield says, they have decided not to release it until the end of

next month so it can be included in a rollup package. So much for customer


And if you think the current scans for SQL Server are high, you ain't seen

nuthin' yet. Litchfield has also discovered a heap based buffer overflow in

SQLServer 2000 that allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote

control over the server in the context of the SQLSERVER service. Just the

mention of this type of exploit makes a blackhat's mouth water in Pavlovian


But even though he provided fully-functioning exploit code to Microsoft,

Litchfield tells me it took them a week to respond with simple confirmation

they were able to recreate the issue. This is simply unacceptable.

Litchfield claims similar discoveries that even eight months later have

still not been addressed by Microsoft.

Enter the Vendor Notification Alerts (VNA). Litchfield has decided to roll

out an interesting vulnerability alert system somewhere between "full" and

"wait for a patch" disclosure.

These VNA's will disclose the vendor and problem product, along with general

exploitation protection methods, without giving away too much detail about

the vulnerability itself. In this way, the heat can be turned up on the

vendor and customers can be alerted to the fact that problems exist, but a

blackhat won't get enough information to design an exploit.

To date, 15 such issues exist with other products, including more issues

with Oracle, and can be viewed on NGSSoftware's web site.

In addition, Litchfield's "Typhon II" vulnerability assessment tool will

have checks for most of these vulnerabilities built into it. Though I'm not

one to make public endorsements for commercial products, I can tell you that

purchasing a product that alerts you to problems vendors haven't even

addressed yet is most definitely a smart thing to consider.

Any successful company knows a customer's interests should come first. If

the timely distribution and maintenance of critical security patches for

their products is too much for a vendor to deal with, they should get out of

the software business. Hopefully NGSSoftware's VNA idea will catch on, and

patch production can take priority without exposing the customer to

unnecessary risk. By Timothy M. Mullen

blog comments powered by Disqus