April 28 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. is not Argentina. Certainly
not.
Real wages in this country aren't 20 percent lower than they
were seven years ago, goods imported from Europe don't cost more
than four times as they did then and 40 percent of the population
isn't living in poverty.
Still, there are some disturbing parallels between the U.S.
of today and the Argentina of the 1990s when the country was
living well beyond its means, borrowing abroad to finance large
budget and current account deficits, while government leaders
ignored the urgent need for more prudent fiscal policies.
And in the final pages of a new book that tells in exquisite
and chilling detail the Argentine story of borrowing, boom and
bust, Washington Post financial reporter Paul Blustein notes some
of those parallels in terms of large foreign borrowing and the
possibility of a shock associated with a reduction in such flows
``It could happen here,'' Blustein writes in ``And the Money
Kept Rolling In (And Out)'' (published by Public Affairs).
``Americans who give Argentina's story fair consideration
and conclude otherwise are deluding themselves. The risks are much
lower for the United States than they were for Argentina, but they
are unacceptably high.
``The words of Miguel Kiguel, Argentina's former finance
undersecretary, are apropos: `Once you know the markets are there,
and there is financing, you behave as if financing will be there
forever.'
Same `Cavalier' Attitude
``The United States has shown every sign of having adopted
that same cavalier, incautious attitude in the first few years of
the twenty-first century,'' Blustein says.
Argentina had its spree and since the end of 2001 has paid a
horrendous price for its folly. It had borrowed in dollars and
hadn't nearly enough to repay its exploding debt when foreign
investors shut off the flow of new money.
There has been no similar day of reckoning yet for the U.S.,
and the eventual price to be paid is unknown. It shouldn't be on a
scale vaguely comparable with that of Argentina's, though it may
be uncomfortably large.
The U.S. economy is far larger than Argentina's of the '90s,
and thus better able to sustain even a large shock. More
importantly, this country's foreign debt is also denominated in
dollars, which the Federal Reserve can create at will -- though
last week Fed Governor Donald L. Kohn warned there is a distinct
limit to that will.
Sharing the Blame
The book by Blustein, a former colleague of mine at the Post,
is a fascinating, well written international tale, as the subtitle
indicates: ``Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of
Argentina.'' Some key U.S. government officials also played a role
and hardly covered themselves with glory.
Everyone gets a share of the blame. Argentine politicians
who would not curb deficit spending so long as foreign financing
was available, International Monetary Fund officials who foolishly
helped the country defend an ultimately unsustainable currency peg
of one peso to $1, and investment bankers who made tens of
millions of dollars in underwriting and trading fees on Argentine
government bonds while issuing misleading research reports on the
country's prospects.
Blustein, a meticulous reporter, quotes liberally from
previously unpublished internal IMF staff memos that called for
taking a tougher line with the Argentine government as its debts
mounted. When only a miracle could have allowed Argentina to
maintain its currency peg and avoid defaulting on its debt, top
IMF officials temporized, partly to avoid having the IMF blamed
for triggering a default.
Current Account Deficit
The delay in recognizing reality made the eventual cost of
changing policies far greater. For one thing, the government
forced banks to buy large quantities of government debt, which in
the end all but destroyed the Argentine banking system. In the
process, the savings of many ordinary citizens were wiped out.
In his speech on April 22 at Bard College in Annandale-on-
Hudson, New York, Kohn said the burgeoning U.S. current account
deficit, which is predicted to be close to 6 percent of GDP this
year, is unsustainable. Eventually there will have to be an
adjustment, he said.
``In all likelihood, adjustments toward reduced imbalances in
the United States and globally will be handled well by markets,
without, by themselves, disrupting the good, overall performance
of the U.S. economy -- provided, of course, that the Federal
Reserve reacts appropriately to foster price and economic
stability,'' Kohn said.
Restoring Fiscal Discipline
On the other hand, likelihood is not certainty.
``Complacency would be ill-advised,'' he cautioned.
``Although the odds seem favorable for an orderly adjustment, the
current imbalances are large and -- importantly for gauging risks
-- unusual from a historical perspective.''
While it isn't clear the shift from federal budget surpluses
in the late '90s to today's large and continuing deficits has
played a large role in making the current account deficits worse,
a better fiscal balance going forward could help when they begin
to shrink, as the eventually must.
``A permanent correction to the spending imbalances must
involve the restoration of fiscal discipline and long-run
solutions to the financing problems of Social Security, Medicare
and Medicaid,'' Kohn said. ``Achieving these objectives are
important in any event, but they take on added weight to the
extent that we cannot count on an ever-increasing flow of global
savings coming into the United States.
The Need for Listening Up
``Without a resolution of these fiscal problems, the
balancing of aggregate production and spending would be much more
difficult and would result in intensified pressures on interest
rates,'' Kohn said.
And he concluded by saying that no one should assume that
monetary policy could necessarily offset those pressures on
interest rates if cutting rates would jeopardize price stability.
Indeed, if inflation threatened, the Fed should not ``hesitate to
raise rates because higher rates mean higher debt-servicing
burdens for the current account, the fiscal authority or
households,'' Kohn said.
Yes, the Fed could provide a plentiful supply of dollars when
the foreign capital inflow slows down, only it won't if the cost
is a surge in inflation. The fiscal authority -- that is,
President George W. Bush and Congress -- ought to listen up.
To contact the writer of this column:
John M. Berry in Washington at
jberry5@bloomberg.net .