Aug. 30 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. safety investigators probing a Comair crash in Kentucky that killed 49 people are looking into why pilots may have skipped the basic task of using a cockpit instrument to determine they were on the wrong runway.

Using a compass or ``heading bug'' to confirm the correct runway is a procedure ``an awful lot of pilots use, including myself,'' said John Cox, a former airline pilot and safety consultant. ``It is a normal part of basic airmanship. You're taught that very early in flight training.''

Comair Flight 5191 crashed Aug. 27 after using Runway 26, which was too short for a safe takeoff. Runways are aligned according to compass headings, so the pilots' instruments should have told them they were on an incorrect heading of 260 degrees, not the 220 degrees to place them on the longer Runway 22.

``These guys would have had to have made multiple mistakes for this to have happened,'' said Jon Kettles, a Dallas-based lawyer who specializes in air crashes.

A cockpit compass beacon would have been an easy indicator that the plane was on the wrong heading, Kettles said. ``They really should have seen that, but there were a series of other basic operating procedures that they probably missed as well,'' he said.

The Canadair CRJ regional jet, made by Bombardier Inc., tore through the airport's perimeter fence, clipped trees and crashed, catching fire and killing the 47 passengers and two crew members. The co-pilot was the sole survivor. The pre-dawn flight by Comair, a unit of Delta Air Lines Inc., had been destined for Atlanta.

Documenting Cockpit Actions

National Transportation Safety Board investigators have made no comments on whether the pilots checked the heading before takeoff, said Ted Lopatkiewicz, a board spokesman.

``We would certainly document everything that happened to the most extent possible in that cockpit leading up to the accident,'' Lopatkiewicz said. He said he didn't know if the cockpit voice recorder tape would reveal whether they checked the heading.

The NTSB is also examining several other issues that may be related to the crash, including the role of the lone controller working at the airport that morning and whether the pilots took the wrong runway because of confusion resulting from changes made a week earlier to the airport's taxiways and runway lights.

Joshua Hammond, a spokesman for Cincinnati-based Comair, wouldn't comment on the pilots' training or specifics on what happened in the cockpit before the crash.

`What Were They Talking About?'

Cockpit communication, reliance on instruments and whether the pilots went over required pre-flight checklists will be important parts of the safety board's probe, said Dan Rose, a partner in New York-based Kreindler & Kreindler, which specializes in aviation accident litigation.

Even silence on the cockpit voice recorder may indicate that the pilots weren't talking to or challenging each other, Rose said. Too much talk not related to work can be a distraction, he said.

``What were they talking about?'' said Rose, a former Navy jet flier who is now a private pilot. ``The bulk of the responsibility will undoubtedly lie with the flight crew, who has all these indicators and the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight.''

Comair Captain Jeffrey Clay, 35, taxied the jet onto the runway the morning of the accident. First Officer James Polehinke, 44, took the controls from the captain after the plane taxied onto the wrong runway. Clay died in the crash and Polehinke remains hospitalized.

Too Soon for Conclusions

It's too soon to make any conclusions about what the pilots did in the cockpit, said Cox, president of Washington-based Safety Operating Systems and former head of safety for the Air Line Pilots Association union. ``We don't know whether they did or didn't'' look at the heading bug, he said.

``You'll find there are a number of things that led the guys to end up on the wrong runway,'' said Kevin Darcy, who spent 17 years on Boeing Co.'s air-safety investigation team and is a partner at Seattle-based Safety Services International LLC. ``There can be distractions. Once all those factors come together, then the way error or errors were made becomes a little bit more understandable.''

To contact the reporters on this story: John Hughes in Washington at jhughes5@bloomberg.net; Mary Schlangenstein in Dallas at maryc.s@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: August 30, 2006 17:49 EDT