Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- In the year that has passed since Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed, there haven’t been many good guys to emerge from the wreckage of the financial crisis. Look hard enough, though, and you will find a few.

It’s a challenge, no doubt. So many people at the highest levels of government and industry blew it, including almost every top banking and securities regulator in Washington. Yet those failings are not what this column is about.

Rather, it’s to introduce you to some of the people I’ve come across over the past year who stuck to their core values in the face of enormous pressure to abandon them.

The other thing they share is they haven’t received the widespread recognition they deserve (unlike, say, Harry Markopolos, the investment manager who spent years trying to get regulators to stop Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme). Someday, when the time comes to hand out awards for taking principled stands under fire, these five should be near the top of the list.

1. Dick Evans, chief executive officer, Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc.

He said no to the government’s bailout money.

Of the 24 companies in the KBW Bank Index, San Antonio- based Cullen/Frost was one of three that declined to participate in the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program. Many banks applied for TARP funds because their bosses thought the government was forcing it on them. For the 63-year-old Evans, who joined Cullen/Frost in 1971 and has been its CEO since 1997, the decision not to seek taxpayer money was strictly a financial one.

Cullen/Frost was profitable and had plenty of capital. Evans and his team concluded that the true cost of the government’s funds was higher than advertised. They thought taking the money would dilute their shareholders’ stake. Throughout the whole mess, the company has reported profits every quarter.

Other banks that refused TARP funds include People’s United Financial Inc. of Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Commerce Bancshares Inc. of Kansas City, Missouri. One thing that sets Cullen/Frost apart is its history. It was the only one of the 10 largest Texas banks to survive the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis. It’s managing just fine this time, too.

2. Joseph St. Denis, former vice president of accounting policy, AIG Financial Products.

American International Group Inc. hired this former Securities and Exchange Commission accountant in June 2006 to help clean up its financial-reporting systems. Within a year, St. Denis said he had found serious errors. Soon after, the head of AIG Financial Products, Joseph Cassano, began excluding him from discussions about the “super senior” credit-default swaps that ultimately sank the company. Cassano also demoted him. St. Denis did the right thing: He quit, at great personal cost.

In an October 2008 letter to congressional investigators, St. Denis said Cassano had told him: “I have deliberately excluded you from the valuation of the super seniors because I was concerned that you would pollute the process.” When St. Denis resigned in October 2007, he walked away from a $325,000 guaranteed bonus.

According to his letter, St. Denis told the division’s general counsel he “could not accept the risk to AIG and myself of being isolated from corporate accounting policy personnel.” He also briefed AIG’s internal and outside auditors.

By September 2008, AIG had collapsed. Today, the 45-year- old St. Denis leads the Office of Research and Analysis for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in Washington, which regulates the auditing profession. His job includes helping the board’s inspectors spot accounting tricks that auditors miss.

Nice trade.

3. Charles Bowsher, former chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank System’s Office of Finance.

Bowsher resigned in March, less than two years into the job and just one week before the government-chartered system’s 12 regional banks were due to file their combined annual report. The reason: As an audit-committee member, he wasn’t comfortable signing off on their financial statements.

Specifically, he was bothered by the accounting standards and processes the banks were using to value their mortgage- backed securities. He also wasn’t about to risk his reputation. Bowsher, 78, was comptroller general of the U.S. from 1981 to 1996, during which time he was among the first to warn the public about the brewing S&L crisis and the need for regulation of derivatives dealers.

The shame is that more corporate directors don’t have the guts to do what he did.

4. & 5. Tom Linsmeier and Marc Siegel, members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.

Last April, the FASB caved to pressure by Congress and changed its rules so that banks and insurance companies could exclude huge unrealized losses on mortgage-backed securities from their earnings and regulatory capital. The decision promises to stain the board’s reputation as an independent standard-setting body for years to come.

The ruling wasn’t unanimous, however. Linsmeier, a former accounting professor at Michigan State University, and Siegel, a longtime forensic accountant, voted against the change. (The measure passed by a 3-2 vote.)

In a joint dissent, they wrote that “investors generally have opined that their preference is for the fair value of financial instruments to be reflected in net income.” Delaying recognition of losses, they said, may result in “a negative effect on investor confidence.” Linsmeier and Siegel emerged with their reputations enhanced.

That should be the greatest reward of all.

(Jonathan Weil is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the writer of this column: Jonathan Weil in New York at jweil6@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: September 9, 2009 21:00 EDT